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ABSTRACT
A rational agent adopts (or changes) its goals when new
information (beliefs) becomes available or its desires (e.g.,
tasks it is supposed to carry out) change. In conventional ap-
proaches to goal generation in which a goal is considered as
a “particular” desire, a goal is adopted if and only if all con-
ditions leading to its generation are satisfied. It is then sup-
posed that all beliefs are equally relevant and their sources
completely trusted.
However, that is not a realistic setting. In fact, depending
on the agent’s trust in the source of a piece of information,
an agent may decide how strongly it takes into consideration
such piece of information in goal generation. On the other
hand, not all beliefs are equally relevant to the adoption of
a given goal, and a given belief may not be equally relevant
to the adoption of different goals.
We propose an approach which takes into account both
the relevance of beliefs and the trust degree of the source
from which the corresponding piece of information comes,
in desire/goal generation. Two algorithms for updating the
mental state of an agent in this new setting and three ways
for comparing the resulting fuzzy set of desires have been
given. Finally, two fundamental postulates any rational goal
election function should obey have been stated.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.3 [Artificial Intelligence]: Deduction and Theorem
Proving—Nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Goal generation, beliefs and desires, fuzzy logic
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Although there has been much discussion on belief change,
goal change has not received much attention. Most works on
goal change found in the literature do not build on results on
belief change. That is the case of [2], in which the authors
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propose a formal representation for goals as rational desires
and introduce and formalize dynamic goal hierarchies, but
do not formalize explicitly beliefs and plans; or of [16], in
which the authors propose an explicit representation of goals
suited to conflict resolution based on a preference ordering
of sets of goals. Another approach is [15], which models
a multi-agent system in which an agent adopts a goal if
requested to do so and the new goal is not conflicting with
existing goals. This approach is based on goal persistence,
i.e., an agent maintains its goals unless explicitly requested
to drop them by the originating agent. The main lack of
the above approaches is that they suppose that an agent
does not use its own mental state for updating goals in a
general way. One of the first approaches in this line is that
proposed by Thomason [17] whose objective was to describe
a formalism designated to integrate reasoning about desires
and planning. His motivation was twofold: (i) reflecting on
the need to extend planning formalisms to allow inferred
goals; and (ii) explaining the need to extend a bare logic
of belief and desire to a true system of practical reasoning
by adding the capability of reasoning about actions. The
work proposed by Broersen and colleagues [3], introduces
the BOID architecture in which goals are generated from the
conditional mental attitudes beliefs, obligations, intentions
and desires. Also the approach proposed by Dignum and
colleagues [8], and more recently the one proposed by us
[7] are very much in this line. However, (i) the fact that a
belief might be more or less relevant to generating a given
goal; and (ii) the influence of the reliabilities of the sources
of information, are rarely considered.
In this work, we consider the direct relevance relation
among beliefs with respect to a given desire/goal, and how
this relation influences goal generation. Here, the influence
of a belief depends on two factors: the importance of be-
liefs, and how strongly the agent trusts the source of infor-
mation. In standard works on goal generation, beliefs were
represented by beliefs which must be true (or false) for gen-
erating a goal. If one of the beliefs does not abide by these
requirements, the relevant goal is not generated. This is a
strong restriction. Indeed, in real life, depending on the im-
portance an agent gives to each belief related to a goal, and
on the trust it has in the sources of information, it may de-
cide to generate the goal even if not all those conditions are
verified.
Let us consider the following example. Suppose you are
looking for a house and you cannot go to the place to take
a look. Of course, you have some preferences concerning
the house you would like to buy. Let us suppose that those
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preferences are expressed by the following rule: “if the house
has a garden, is near the center of the town, and if it is not
close to an airport, I would like to buy it”. If completely
trusted sources tell you that the house has a garden and is
near the center but close to an airport, what will you do?
If the fact that the house is not close to an airport is the
most important requirement for you, you will never buy that
house. Instead, if you deem more important to have a house
with a garden, it would not be unthinkable that you adopt
the desire to buy that house even if it is close to an airport.
Now, let us suppose that information about the house you
are interested in comes from different sources you trust to
different degrees. Let us suppose that your most important
requirement is that the house has a garden. If the first
and untrusted source, tells you that the house has a garden,
even if the two other and completely trusted sources tell you
respectively that the house is near the center and not close
to an airport, it is not unthinkable that you do not adopt
the desire to buy that house anyway.
In this paper, we attempt to take into account that kind
of considerations in goal generation. The relevance among
beliefs with respect to a desire are defined as an order re-
lation while we use fuzzy logic [21] to represent degrees of
trust.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
fuzzy logic-based formalism which will be used throughout
the paper. Section 3 illustrates how changes due to the
arrival of new information and/or a new desire influences
both the agent’s sets of beliefs and desires. In Section 4,
we propose three methods for comparing the generated sets
of desires. In Section 5, the notion of goal set, which is
one of the most preferred sets of desires, is defined and two
fondamental postulates for a goal set election function are
established. Section 6 concludes and discusses the future
work.
2. THE FORMALISM
Desires (or motivations) are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for action. When a desire is met by other condi-
tions that make it possible for an agent to act, that desire
becomes a goal. Therefore, given this technical definition of
a desire, all goals are desires, but not all desires are goals.
We distinguish two crisp sets of atomic propositions (or
atoms): the set D of all possible desires and the set K of
all possible knowledge items. For the sake of simplicity,
we make the assumption that desires and knowledge items
are on completely different levels: a desire is not a piece of
knowledge and vice versa. However, desires can depend on
knowledge, while knowledge never depends on desires.
2.1 Basic Considerations
2.1.1 Fuzzy Sets
Fuzzy sets allow the representation of imprecise informa-
tion. Information is imprecise when the value of the variable
to which it refers cannot be completely determined within a
given universe of discourse. Fuzzy sets are then a generaliza-
tion of classical sets obtained by replacing the characteristic
function of a set A, χA, which takes up values in {0, 1}
(χA(x) = 1 iff x ∈ A, χA(x) = 0 otherwise) with a mem-
bership function µA, which can take up any value in [0, 1].
The value µA(x) or, more simply, A(x) is the membership
degree of element x in A, i.e., the degree to which x belongs
in A.
A fuzzy set is completely defined by its membership func-
tion. Therefore, it is useful to define a few terms describing
various features of this function, summarized in Figure 1.
Given a fuzzy set A, its core is the (conventional) set of all
elements x such that A(x) = 1; its support, supp(A), is the
set of all x such that A(x) > 0. A fuzzy set is normal if its
core is nonempty. The set of all elements x of A such that
A(x) ≥ α, for a given α ∈ (0, 1], is called the α-cut of A,
denoted Aα.
-cutα
µ
A
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α
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Figure 1: Core, support, and α-cuts of a set A of the
real line, having membership function µA.
The usual set-theoretic operations of union, intersection,
and complement can be defined as a generalization of their
counterparts on classical sets by introducing two families of
operators, called triangular norms and triangular co-norms.
In practice, it is usual to employ the min norm for intersec-
tion and the max co-norm for union. Given two fuzzy sets
A and B, and an element x,
(A ∪B)(x) = max{A(x), B(x)}; (1)
(A ∩B)(x) = min{A(x), B(x)}; (2)
A¯(x) = 1−A(x). (3)
2.1.2 Possibility and Necessity Measures
The membership function of a fuzzy set describing impre-
cise information may be viewed as a possibility distribution
[22]. Indeed, if A is the fuzzy set of values that a variable
x can take up, we denote by pix = µA the possibility distri-
bution attached to x. The identity pix(u) = µA(u) = A(u)
means that the degree to which value u belongs to A is the
same as the possibility degree of x being equal to u when all
is known about x is that it is constrained to take a value in
A.
A possibility distribution pi induces a possibility measure
and its dual necessity measure, denoted by Π and N respec-
tively. Both measures apply to a crisp set A and are defined
as follows:
Π(A) ≡ sup
s∈A
pi(s); (4)
N(A) ≡ 1−Π(A¯) = inf
s∈A¯
{1− pi(s)}. (5)
In words, the possibility measure of set A corresponds to
the greatest of the possibilities associated to its elements;
conversely, the necessity measure of A is equivalent to the
impossibility of its complement A¯.
2.2 Formalism’s Components
We present now a fuzzy formalism that accounts for both
the relevance and the trust of belief sources. Our formalism
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is a fuzzy extension of the formalism proposed in [7] which
is an extension of the one proposed in [14]. Like in these
approaches, we use a minimal language consisting of atomic
beliefs and desires and their negations, and rules expressing
relations among beliefs and desires. The extension we are
proposing consists of two points:
1. We assume that an agent does not always trust its
belief sources completely;
2. We assume that beliefs are differently relevant with
respect to the desire to be generated.
Thanks to the first extension proposal, it is possible to
represent how strongly the agent believes in a given piece of
information. We suppose that this trust degree depends on
how reliable is the source of the piece of information1. Here,
we are not interested in the computation of such reliabilities;
we merely assume that, for an agent, a belief has a trust
degree in [0, 1]. An approach to the problem of assigning
fuzzy trust degrees to information sources can be found for
example in previous work by Castelfranchi and colleagues
[4, 11].
The second extension proposal, on the other hand, allows
us to take into account the fact that a belief could be: (i) cru-
cial for adopting a given desire but less crucial for adopting
another different desire; and (ii) more crucial than another
in the generation of a particular desire.
Consequently, if we take into account the fact that here
the notion of belief is not conceived as an all-or-nothing
concept but as a “fuzzy concept”, also the relations among
beliefs and desires are fuzzy. The fuzzy counterpart of a
desire-adoption rule defined in [7] is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Desire-Adoption Rule). A desire-
adoption rule is an expression of the form b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧
d1 ∧ . . . ∧ dm ½ d, or δ ½ d, where bi ∈ {p,¬p} for some
p ∈ K, dj ∈ {q,¬q} for some q ∈ D, d ∈ D, d 6= dj for all
j, and δ ∈ (0, 1].
The meaning of the first type of desire-adoption rule which
might be called conditional, is: “an agent desires d as much
as it believes b1, . . . , bn and desires d1, . . . , dm. The meaning
of the second type of rule, which might be called uncondi-
tional, is: “the agent (unconditionally) desires d to degree
δ”.
Given a desire-adoption rule R, we shall denote lhs(R) the
set of literals that make up the conjunction on the left-hand
side of R, and rhs(R) the atom on the right-hand side of
R. Furthermore, if S is a set of rules, we define rhs(S) =
{rhs(R) : R ∈ S}.
2.2.1 Relevance and Trust of Beliefs
By taking into account both the relevance order and trust
of beliefs in goal generation it is possible to make trade-offs
among beliefs in general, and between most relevant (trusted
or untrusted) and less relevant (trusted or untrusted) beliefs
in particular, as it happens in real life. Indeed, even if a less
relevant (and trusted) belief is false, we often generate a de-
sire anyway or, in the opposite case, even if a highly relevant
(but untrusted) belief is true, it would not be unthinkible
that we do not generate the desire. It all depends on the
1Throughout the rest of the paper we make the assumption
that the trust of a belief is the trust of its source; hence, we
will treat the two expressions as synonyms.
relevance and/or trust beliefs have in the process of goal
generation.
Let us reconsider the example introduced in Section 1.
Suppose you are interested in buying a house, and that your
preferences are expressed by the following rule for adopting
your desire “to buy a house”, bh: “if the house has a garden,
is near the center of the town, and if it is not close to an
airport, I would like to buy it”. Let us suppose that
(i) information about the house you are interested in
comes from different sources you trust to different de-
grees, and
(ii) your most important requirement is that the house has
a garden.
If a first and completely untrusted source tells you the house
has a garden (hg), and a second and a third completely
trusted sources tell you, respectively, the house is near the
center of the town (hc) and not close to any airport (ha),
will you adopt the desire to buy that house?
Following both a conventional approach, in which neither
the relevance of the requirements nor the trust of the sources
of information are considered, and the approach in which
only the influence order of requirements is considered, you
would buy that house, because all your preferences are sat-
isfied and you disregard how trustworthy available informa-
tion is!
Instead, by following the approach we are proposing, in
which both the relevance order of requirements and the
trust of sources are considered, it is not unthinkable that
you would not adopt the desire to buy that house, because
the information that your most important requirement is
satisfied is not trusted.
In a different scenario, if
(i) your most important requirement is that the house is
not close to an airport, and
(ii) the first and the second completely trusted sources tell
you, respectively, that the house has a garden and is
near the center of the town, but
(iii) a third and completely untrusted source tells you that
the house is close to an airport;
will you adopt the desire to buy that house? In this case, it
is not unthinkable that you would desire to buy that house
because the source of information that the house is close to
an airport is untrusted.
We define a trusted belief and the relevance relations a-
mong beliefs as follows:
Definition 2 (Trusted Belief). A trusted belief is a
belief b ∈ K the agent trusts with a degree α ∈ (0, 1]. b is
completely trusted (untrusted) if α = 1 (= 0).
Here, we suppose that the degree of trust of a belief b cor-
responds to the degree to which the agent trusts the source
of b.
Definition 3 (Relevance Among Beliefs). Let
d ∈ D be a desire, b, b′ ∈ K be two belief atoms. b is at
least as relevant as b′ for generating desire d, noted b ºd b′,
iff the information brought by b is at least as influencial for
generating d as the information brought by b′. The relevance
order is strict, noted b Âd b′, when b ºd b′ and b′ 6ºd b.
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In the example, if knowing that the house has a garden
were at least as relevant for you as knowing that the house
is near the center of the town, this could be represented by
stating hg ºbh hc. Besides, if you could not stand loud
noise, this could be represented by ha Âbh hg.
2.2.2 Agent’s State
In this section, we first define the mental state of an agent
and then answer the following important questions concern-
ing the influence of the mental state in desire adoption:
1. Which beliefs do really matter in desire adoption?
2. When is a desire-adoption rule activated?
The state of an agent is completely described by a triple
S = 〈B,RJ ,J 〉, where
• B is a fuzzy set of atoms (beliefs) on the universe of
discourse K;
• J is a fuzzy set of atoms (desires or motivations) on
the universe of discourse D;
• RJ is a set of desire-adoption rules, such that, for each
desire d, RJ contains at most one rule of the form
δ½ d.
The membership degree of a belief atom in B is the degree
to which an agent trusts the information represented by the
atom; B can be naturally extended to literals by noting that
B(¬p) = 1 − B(p). RJ contains the rules which generate
desires from beliefs and other more basic desires (subde-
sires). J contains all desires which may be deduced from
the agents’s desire-adoption rule base, given the agent’s be-
liefs and the agent’s desires. Besides, we suppose that an
agent disposes of a total order ºd on beliefs for every desire
d.
We suppose that among the beliefs influencing the process
of adopting a desire, the beliefs which really matter are those
which both
(i) come from trusted enough sources, and
(ii) are not dominated.
The justification of hypothesis (i) is that, depending on the
desire the agent has to adopt, it might have different thresh-
old degrees to define a source as being trusted [10]. For ex-
ample, the threshold used by a doctor who has to decide
wheather to make a surgical intervention or not, depending
on how much she trusts the results of medical analysis of her
patient, is different from the threshold she uses if she has to
prescribe an antibiotic. The justification of hypothesis (ii)
is that beliefs which are not dominated are those which de-
termine the agent’s decision to adopt or not a desire. For
example, if the belief that the house has a garden, hg, is
not dominated, unlike the belief that the house is near an
airport, ha, the agent’s decision to adopt the desire to buy
the house depends on belief hg.
Definition 4 (Trusted Enough Belief). Let R be
a desire-adoption rule, d = rhs(R) be the desire to be
adopted, b ∈ lhs(R) be a belief, and αd be the threshold for
adopting desire d: b is said to be trusted enough if and only
if B(b) ≥ αd.
We can extend this definiton to sets of trusted beliefs.
Definition 5 (Trusted Beliefs for a Desire).
Let R be a desire-adoption rule with d = rhs(R), B be the
fuzzy set of agent’s beliefs, and Bαd be the αd-cut of B. The
current crisp set of trusted enough beliefs for R is
Td = lhs(R) ∩ Bαd .
Definition 6 (Non-Dominated Beliefs). Let R be a
desire-adoption rule with d = rhs(R). The crisp set of non-
dominated belief atoms for R is
Nd = {b ∈ lhs(R) : ¬∃b′ ∈ lhs(R) such that b′ Âd b}
From the two above definitions we can now define the
beliefs which are really taken into account by the agent.
Definition 7 (Really Relevant Beliefs). Let R
be a desire-adoption rule with d = rhs(R). The crisp set
of really relevant beliefs for R is
RRd = Td ∩Nd
We can observe in the following propositions, two behav-
iors very common in real life:
Observation 1. If all the beliefs in the left-hand side of
the rule are both equally trusted and trusted enough, only the
non-dominated beliefs matter in the desire-adoption process,
i.e., RRd = Nd.
Observation 2. If all the beliefs in the left-hand side of
the rule are non-dominated, only the trusted enough beliefs
matter in the desire-adoption process, i.e., RRd = Td.
We suppose that, when the agent is adopting a desire, it
only cares about subdesires and the really relevant beliefs.
The other beliefs are not considered. Let us come back to
the example about the surgeon who has to make a surgical
intervention. She has the following rule: “if the patient is
not extremely anemic (¬an), she is not a child (¬ch), she
is not allergic to anaesthesia (¬al), and she is in danger
of death (dd), the doctor adopts the desire to operate her
(op). Let us suppose that the doctor has no subdesires. The
desire-adoption rule representing the doctor’s reasoning is
¬an ∧ ¬ch ∧ ¬al ∧ dd½ op.
Let us suppose that the doctor has the following trust de-
grees:
• 0.7 to the laboratory which provided the haemochrome
exam;
• 1 to herself for judging both if the patient is a child or
not, and if the patient is in danger of death;
• 0.8 to the nurse who has filled out the record of patient
allergies;
Suppose that the relevance order for deciding whether to
make the operation or not is dd º al º an º ch, and al º
dd. Suppose also that:
• the laboratory informs the doctor that the patient is
anemic (an);
• the doctor thinks the patient is not a child and she is
in danger of death (¬ch ∧ dd); and
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• the nurse informs the doctor that the patient is allergic
to anaesthesia (al).
If the surgeon deems as being trusted enough only com-
pletely trusted information (trust degree equal to 1), by fol-
lowing Definition 7, the really relevant belief is the belief
about danger of death, (dd), because both its trust degree
is 1, and it is one of the most relevant beliefs. In fact, be-
cause Top = {ch, dd} and the set of non dominated beliefs is
Nd = {dd, al}, we have RRd = {dd}. Therefore, the doctor’s
decision to operate or not depends, in this case, merely on
her own belief about the danger of death of the patient; that
is, the activation of the corresponding desire-adoption rule
depends, in this case, on the single belief dd.
In general, the activation of a rule also depends on its sub-
desires. For example, in a health system where a doctor is
liable for her mistakes, a surgeon must be willing to take on
the liability of an operation. Let us represent such willing-
ness by desire o. Then, the desire-adoption rule representing
the surgeon’s reasoning would become:
¬an ∧ ¬ch ∧ ¬al ∧ dd ∧ o½ op.
Therefore, the doctor’s decision to operate or not depends
not merely on her own belief about the danger of death of
the patient but also on her willingness to take on the respon-
sibility of an operation. The activation of the corresponding
desire-adoption rule depends then both on belief dd and on
the degree to which she is willing to operate, o.
Definition 8 (Degree of Activation of a Rule).
Let R be a desire-adoption rule. The degree af activation of
R, Deg(R), is given by:
Deg(R) = min( min
b∈RRd
B(b), min
d∈lhs(R)
J (d)).
for conditional desire-adoption rules, and by:
Deg(R) = δ if R = δ½ d.
Remark 1. In the case of conditional desire-adoption
rules, RRd = ∅ ⇒ Deg(R) = 0.
Indeed, if there is no trusted enough belief literal in the
left-hand side of a rule, a rational agent does not adopt the
corresponding desire at all.
Let us come back to our doctor’s example. If the doctor is
completely willing to operate (to a degree 1), she absolutely
(to a degree 1) adopts the desire to operate her patient. At
first sight, that may look extremely risky and not rational;
however, when confronted with a situation whereby she be-
lieves a patient would die if not operated, a doctor shall
operate anyway, even if there is a risk of an anaphylactic
shock. This is the only alternative that offers a chance to
save the patient’s life.
Finally, we do not expect a rational agent to formulate
desires out of whim, but based on some rational argument.
To model that state of affairs, desire-adoption rules play the
role of rational arguments. We define the degree to which a
desire is justified as follows.
Definition 9 (Degree of Justification). The de-
gree of justification of desire d is defined as follows:
J (d) = max
R∈RJ :rhs(R)=d
Deg(R).
This degree represents how rational it is the fact that an
agent desires d.
3. CHANGES IN THE AGENT’S STATE
The acquisition of a new belief with a given degree of
trust in state S may cause a change in the belief set B and
this may also cause a change in the desire set J with the
variation of the justification degree of desires. Likewise, the
arising of a new desire with a given degree may also cause
changes in the desire set J .
3.1 Changes Caused by a new Belief
3.1.1 Changes in the Agents’s Belief Set
To account for changes in the belief set B caused by the ac-
quisition of a new belief, we define a new operator for belief
change, noted ∗, which is an adaptation of the well known
AGM operator for belief revision [1] to the fuzzy belief set-
ting, in the spirit of [19]. The main difference with our work
is that we consider literals instead of arbitrary formulas but
in addition we also consider the trust degrees of beliefs.
Definition 10 (Belief Change Operator). Let
∗ be the belief change operator. Let b ∈ K be an atomic
knowledge item and α
l
, with l ∈ {b,¬b}, a piece of informa-
tion concerning b, with a trust degree α ∈ [0, 1]. Let B be a
fuzzy set of beliefs. The new fuzzy set of beliefs B′ = B ∗ α
l
is such that:
B′(b) =
 B(b) · (1− α) + α, if l = b;
B(b) · (1− α), if l = ¬b. (6)
Proposition 1. If l = b, i.e., if the new piece of infor-
mation does not contradict b, applying the operator ∗ never
causes the trust degree of b to decrease, i.e., B′(b) ≥ B(b).
Proof. If B(b) = 0 the result is obvious. Otherwise, if
B(b) > 0, we have B′(b)− B(b) = α · (1− B(b)) ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. If l = ¬b, i.e., if the new piece of infor-
mation contradicts b, applying the operator ∗ never causes
the trust degree of b to increase, i.e., B′(b) ≤ B(b).
Proof. B′(b)− B(b) = −α · B(b) ≤ 0.
The semantics of our belief change operator is defined by
the following properties. Here B represents a fuzzy belief
set, l an acquired trusted information, supp is the support
of a fuzzy set, and ∪, ∩, ⊆ and ⊇ are fuzzy operators.
• (P ∗ 1)(Stability) The result of applying * in B with l
is always a fuzzy set of beliefs:
B ∗ α
l
is a fuzzy set of beliefs.
• (P ∗ 2)(Expansion) If l = b, the fuzzy set of informa-
tion expands:
supp(B ∗ α
l
) ⊇ supp(B).
• (P ∗ 3)(Shrinkage) If l = ¬b, the fuzzy set of beliefs
shrinks:
supp(B ∗ α
l
) ⊆ supp(B).
• (P ∗ 4)(Invariance) If the new information is com-
pletely untrusted, i.e., α = 0, invariance holds:
(α = 0)⇒ (B ∗ α
l
= B).
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• (P ∗ 5)(Predictability) The result of applying ∗ con-
tains all beliefs in supp(B ∪ {α
l
}):
supp(B ∗ α
l
) ⊇ supp(B ∪ {α
l
}).
• (P ∗ 6)(Identity) The result of applying ∗ does not
depend on the particular information. If l1(∈
{b1,¬b1}) = l2(∈ {b2,¬b2}) and α1 = α2:
B ∗ α1
l1
= B ∗ α2
l2
.
3.1.2 Changes in the Agents’s Desire Set
The acquisition of a new belief may induce changes in
the justification degree of some desires. More generally, the
acquisition of a new belief may induce changes in the belief
set of an agent which, in turn, may induce changes in its
desire set. Let α
l
, with l ∈ {b,¬b}, be a new belief trusted
to degree α. To account for the changes in the desire set
caused by this new acquisition, we must consider
(i) each rule R ∈ RJ such that b ∈ lhs(R) or ¬b ∈ lhs(R),
and
(ii) the relevance order of beliefs b ∈ lhs(R) with respect
to desire rhs(R), in order to update the justification
value of rhs(R).
The new desire set J ′ is obtained by executing the algorithm
in Figure 2 with the following inputs: B′ = B ∗ α
l
, RJ , D,
and the agent’s relevance order on beliefs. The algorithm
propagates changes until a fixpoint is reached; Ck is the set
of desires whose justification degree changes in step k, i.e.,
∀d ∈ D, d ∈ Ck ⇒ J ′k(d) 6= J ′k−1(d).
Of course, the set RJ does not change.
Proposition 3. If the new information is a positive lit-
eral,
J ′ =
∞[
k=0
J ′k.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, for all b we have
B′(b) ≥ B(b). Therefore, the degree of all desires d in
the new desire set J ′ may not decrease, i.e., for all k,
J ′k(d) ≥ J ′k−1(d).
Proposition 4. If the new information is a negative lit-
eral,
J ′ =
∞\
k=0
J ′k.
Proof. According to Proposition 2, for all b we have
B′(b) ≤ B(b). Therefore, the degree of all desires d in
the new desire set J ′ may not increase, i.e., for all k,
J ′k(d) ≤ J ′k−1(d).
3.2 Changes Caused by a New Desire
The acquisition of a new desire may cause changes in the
fuzzy desire set and in the desire-adoption rule base. In this
work, for the sake of simplicity, we consider only new desires
which are not dependent on beliefs and/or other desires. A
new desire, justified with degree δ, implies the addition of
the desire-generation rule δ ½ d into RJ , resulting in the
new base R′J . By definition of a desire-adoption rule base,
R′J must not contain another δ′ ½ d with δ 6= δ′. How
does S change with the arising of the new desire δ
d
?
1. B′ ← B ∗ α
l
; k ← 1; C0 ← ∅;
2. For each d ∈ D do
(a) consider all Ri ∈ RJ such that rhs(R) = d;
(b) calculate Deg(Ri) by considering B′ and ºd;
(c) J ′0(d)← maxRi Deg(Ri);
(d) if J ′0(d) 6= J (d) then C0 ← C0 ∪ {d}.
3. repeat
(a) Ck ← ∅;
(b) for each d ∈ Ck−1 do
i. for all Rj ∈ RJ such that d ∈ lhs(Rj) do
A. calculate Deg(Rj) considering J ′k−1(d) andºrhs(Rj);
B. J ′k(rhs(Rj))← max
Ri|rhs(Ri)=rhs(Rj)
Deg(Ri);
C. if J ′k(rhs(Rj)) 6= J ′k−1(rhs(Rj))
then Ck ← Ck ∪ {rhs(Rj)}.
ii. k ← k + 1.
4. until Ck−1 = ∅.
5. for all d, J ′(d) is given by the following equation:
J ′(d) =
 J (d), if d 6∈ C;
J ′i (d), otherwise, (7)
where i is such that d ∈ Ci and ∀j 6= i if d ∈ Cj then j ≤ i,
i.e., the justification degree of a “changed” desire is the last
degree it takes, and C =
S∞
k=0 Ck is the set of “changed”
desires.
Figure 2: An algorithm to compute the new desire
set upon arrival of a new belief.
• Any rule δ′½ d with δ 6= δ′ is retracted from RJ ,
• δ½ d is added to RJ ,
It is clear that the arising of a new desire does not change
the belief set of the agent.
The new fuzzy set of desires, J ′, is computed by the al-
gorithm in Figure 3.
4. COMPARING SETS OF DESIRES
As presented in Section 2.2.2, the fuzzy set of current de-
sires J is one of the components of the agent’s mental state.
Such a fuzzy set expresses the fact that an agent may have
many differently justified desires at the same time. However,
it is also essential to represent the fact that not all desires
have the same importance or urgency for the agent. This can
be naturally represented by the notion of utility. We propose
two kinds of represetations for desire utilities which depend
whether the agent disposes of numerical or ordinal utilities.
The first one is inspired by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u : D → IR and associates a real value to all
desires [13]. The second one is inspired by the counterpart of
the von Newmann and Morgenstern expected utility theory
in the framework of possibility theory proposed by Dubois
and Prade [9]. In this case, utilities represent a preference
order among possibility distributions on desires.
We have to extend those notions to the case of fuzzy de-
sire sets. We distinguish three cases. In the first case we
dispose of qualitative utilities; in the second case we dispose
of quantitative utilities; in the last case we do not dispose
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1. if {δ′ ½ d} ∈ RJ then R′J ← (RJ \{δ′ ½ d})∪{δ½ d};
else R′J ←RJ ∪ {δ½ d};
2. k ← 1; C0 ← {d}; J ′0(d)← δ;
3. repeat
(a) Ck ← ∅;
(b) for each d ∈ Ck−1 do
i. for all Rj ∈ R′J such that d ∈ lhs(Rj) do
A. calculate their respective degrees Deg(Rj)
considering J ′k−1(d);
B. J ′k(rhs(Rj))← max
Ri|rhs(Ri)=rhs(Rj)
Deg(Ri);
C. if J ′k(rhs(Rj)) 6= J ′k−1(rhs(Rj))
then Ck ← Ck ∪ {rhs(Rj)}.
ii. k ← k + 1.
4. until Ck−1 = ∅.
5. for all d, J ′(d) is given by Equation 7.
Figure 3: An algorithm to compute the new desire
set upon the arisal of a new desire.
of utilites at all. In all three cases, the preference relation
between two fuzzy sets of desires is noted º.
4.1 Preference under Qualitative Utility
We adapt the notion of pessimistic utilities [9] and opti-
mistic utilities [20] for the purposes of our work.
Definition 11 (Pessimistic Utility). Let J be a
fuzzy set of desires, and u : D → [0, 1] the function which
maps a desire to a qualitative utility. The pessimistic utility
of J , UPes(J ), is given by:
UPes(J ) = min
d
max(1− J (d), u(d)).
UPes(J ) is the inclusion degree of the set of justified desires
in the set of useful desires. If all desires d in J are com-
pletetly justified, i.e., J (d) = 1 ∀d, the pessimistic utility of
J equals the utility of the least useful desire.
Definition 12 (Optimistic Utility). Let J be a
fuzzy set of desires, and u : D → [0, 1] the function wich
maps a desire to a qualitative utility. The optimistic utility
of J , UOpt(J ), is given by:
UOpt(J ) = max
d
min(J (d), u(d)).
UOpt(J ) is the intersection degree of the set of justified de-
sires with the set of useful desires. If all desires d in J are
completetly justified, the optimistic utility of J equals the
utility of the most useful desire.
Definition 13 (Preference). Given two fuzzy sets
of desires J1 and J2, J1 is preferred to J2, in symbols
J1 º J2, iff UPes(J1) > UPes(J2); or UPes(J1) = UPes(J2)
and UOpt(J1) ≥ UOpt(J2).
4.2 Preference under Quantitative Utility
In case we dispose of quantitative utilities, the utility of a
fuzzy set of desires may be calculated as follows.
Definition 14 (Quantitative Utility). Let J be a
fuzzy set of desires, and u : D → IR a function wich maps a
desire to a real value. The utility of J is
U(J ) =
X
d
u(d) · J (d).
U(J ) is the average of utilities weighted by degree of mem-
bership.
Definition 15 (Preference). A fuzzy set of desires
J1 is prefered to J2, in symbols J1 º J2, iff U(J1) ≥ U(J2).
4.3 Preference without Utilities
In case we do not dispose of utilities, we can still compare
sets of desires by using the justification degrees of their el-
ements. We consider two parameters: the possibility Π(J )
and the necessity N(J ) that the fuzzy set J is justified.
Π(J ) = maxd J (D) represents how possibly justified is
the fuzzy set J . Π(J ) = 0 means that J is certainly not a
desire set of the agent. Π(J ) = 1 means that it would not
be surprising at all if J were the desire set of the agent.
N(J ) = 1−maxd∈rhs(RJ )(1−J (d)) represents how surely
justified is the set J . That is because we consider only
desires which are justified, i.e., desires in the right hand
side of a desire-generation rule with a nonzero justification
degree, instead of the entire set of possible desires. N(J ) =
0 means that it would not be surprising at all if J were not
a set of desires of the agent. N(J ) = 1 means that it is
certainly true that J is a set of desires of the agent.
Definition 16 (Preference). A fuzzy set of desire
J1 is preferred to a fuzzy set of desires J2, in symbols
J1 º J2, iff N(J1) > N(J2); or N(J1) = N(J2) and
Π(J1) ≥ Π(J2).
5. GOAL SETS
Goals serve a dual role in the deliberation process, cap-
turing aspects of both intentions and desires. Besides ex-
pressing desirability, when an agent adopts a goal, it also
makes a commitment to pursue the goal. Here, we concen-
trate exclusively on the second role served by a goal. For
more information about intentions see for example Cohen
and Levesque [5].
The main point about desires is that we expect a rational
agent to try and manipulate its surrounding environment to
fulfill them. In general, considering a planning problem P
to solve, not all desires can be fulfilled at the same time,
especially when there is no solution plan which allows to
reach all of them at the same time.
We assume we dispose of a P-dependent function FP wich,
given a fuzzy set of beliefs B and a fuzzy set of desires J ,
returns a degree γ which corresponds to the certainty degree
of the most certain solution plan found [6]. We may call γ
the degree of feasibility of J given B, i.e., FP(B,J ) = γ.
In general, a rational agent will try to reach a set of desires
which, first of all, has a suitable degree of feasibility. The
preference criterion comes into play in a second time.
Definition 17 (γ-Goal Set). A γ-goal set, with γ ∈
[0, 1], in state S is a fuzzy set of desires G such that:
1. G ⊆ J , i.e., for all d ∈ D, G(d) ≤ J (d);
2. FP(B,G) ≥ γ.
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Postulates of a γ-Goal Set Election Function
In general, given a fuzzy set of desires J , there may be more
than one possible γ-goal sets G. However, a rational agent
in state S = 〈B,J ,RJ〉 will elect as the set of goals it is
pursuing one precise goal set G∗, which depends on S.
Let us call Gγ the function which maps a state S into
the γ-goal set elected by a rational agent in state S: G∗ =
Gγ(S). A goal election function Gγ must obey two funda-
mental postulates:
• (G1) ∀S, Gγ(S) is a γ-goal set;
• (G2) ∀S, if G is a γ-goal set, then Gγ(S) º G.
Postulate (G1) requires, as it is obvious, that a goal elec-
tion function Gγ does indeed return a γ-goal set.
Postulate (G2) requires that the γ-goal set returned by
function Gγ be “optimal”, i.e., that a rational agent always
selects one of the most preferrable γ-goal set.
In general, different goal election functions can be defined
that respect the above postulates. While the definition of a
specific goal election function is a critical part of construct-
ing a rational agent framework, this issue falls out of the
scope of this work.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Thomason observes that the relation between goals and
desires becomes crucial when the goal generation process is
considered [17]. Conventional approaches consider goals as
a primitive concept which does not derive from other mental
atitudes. This hypothesis avoids the possibility to take into
account the fact that goals can come from desires; and that
desires can be impracticable or mutually conficting.
Being aware of that, we have proposed a new framework
for generating goals dealing with beliefs and desires in ratio-
nal agents. The originality of such formalism is that it allows
to take into account two considerations frequently made in
real life — relevance of beliefs to a goal and the agent’s trust
in a belief. We have proposed two algorithms for updating
the mental state of an agent in this new setting and three
ways for comparing the resulting fuzzy set of desires have
been given. Finally, two fundamental postulates any ratio-
nal goal election function should obey have been stated.
The next step is to extend our language into a full propo-
sitional one like those used in BDI approaches, for example
[18]. A further step is to define a mapping from BDI men-
tal states to propositional planning in the spirit of the work
by Meneguzzi and colleagues [12] in order to construct a
sort of formalism combining planning with general-purpose
nonmonotonic reasoning about beliefs and desires.
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